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GOVERNANCE OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM
Monetary policy is the most visible of the
Fed’s responsibilities. As the nation’s central
bank, the Federal Reserve regulates the creation
of money and of liquidity more generally. The
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is the
Fed’s monetary-policy body; it consists of the
seven members of the Board of Governors and
the 12 Reserve Bank presidents, five of whom
are voting members at any given time.
The Fed implements its monetary policy by
setting a target federal funds interest rate. The
primary goal of policy is to maintain an inflation
rate that is low and stable—price stability. Price
stability in turn creates an economic environment
that fosters maximum sustainable economic
growth and sustained high employment. In an
environment of price stability, the Fed can respond
flexibly to economic disturbances—an excellent
example is 9/11—that might otherwise lead to
recession. Not all recessions can be avoided, but
price stability does seem to have contributed to a
more stable economy over the past decade or so.
The Fed’s second important responsibility is
to regulate and supervise various kinds of finan-
cial institutions. These include state-chartered
banks that have chosen to become Fed member
banks, all bank-holding companies and all inter-
national banks that operate in the United States.
The Fed’s mission in this regard is to ensure a
I
’m very pleased to be with you today to
discuss the role of the Federal Reserve
banks in the Federal Reserve System. The
Federal Reserve Banks are evolving, along
with the rest of the financial system. As with
other financial institutions, evolution is driven
by major developments in technology, globaliza-
tion, terrorism risks and legislation.
I’ll discuss some of the details of financial
evolution, but will first take up a topic that is
rarely discussed, and one I feel passionate about.
The Federal Reserve System has a mixed public-
private structure. However, the most important
of the Fed’s responsibilities have to be managed
from a public-interest perspective and not from a
profit-making perspective. Although the Fed has
public responsibilities, that does not mean that
Fed operations all have to be managed and con-
ducted from Washington. Indeed, I’ll be making
the argument that the Fed’s mixed public-private
governance structure has been highly effective
in serving the public interest precisely because
not everything is run by a federal agency. The 12
regional Reserve Banks play a key role in the
Federal Reserve and have a lot to do with the
System’s fine record of performance.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments. Alan J. Stamborski provided special
assistance. However, I retain full responsibility
for errors.safe and sound, as well as competitive, banking
system in this country.
A third important responsibility is provision
of financial services to depository institutions
and the federal government. The Fed is the Bank
for bankers. The Fed circulates currency, clears
checks and provides several forms of electronic
payment. The Fed lends funds to banks through
its discount window. This work isn’t ordinarily
the stuff of headlines except in dramatic cases
such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when the Fed
nipped in the bud the potential for a liquidity
crisis. The Fed lent huge sums to banks financially
stressed by the breakdown in the payments sys-
tem and closure of normal market trading. No
purely private firm would have the resources to
provide emergency assistance on such a grand
scale. The Fed’s response to 9/11 provides an
excellent example of how we work with the pri-
vate sector to protect the normal functioning of
private markets.
As the Bank to the U.S. government, the Fed
processes government checks, money orders and
savings bonds, and collects a significant portion
of federal tax deposits. The Fed provides software
and other services that permit the Treasury to
manage its funds efficiently.
As this overview indicates, the Federal
Reserve Banks, with oversight by the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors in Washington, have
a mix of public and private responsibilities.
Monetary policy and bank regulation are clearly
public responsibilities. Financial services to the
banks and the Treasury have mixed public-private
aspects, particularly given that a number of purely
private firms compete with the Fed.
At the center of the Federal Reserve System
is the Board of Governors. Members of the Board
are appointed by the President of the United
States with the advice and consent of the Senate
for terms of office of 14 years. The Board is head-
quartered in Washington, is a federal agency and
is clearly politically accountable. However, the
structure of the System is designed to keep the
Fed independent of partisan politics. The Board
of Governors is not funded by annual appropria-
tions from Congress; rather, the Board is funded
by the 12 quasi-private Reserve Banks from
income on the portfolio of government securities
used to conduct market transactions. Therefore,
the Fed’s budget isn’t directly controlled by the
legislative arm of government.
While the Board of Governors is a federal
agency, each Reserve Bank is a corporation, with
a charter granted by the federal government under
the Federal Reserve Act. Each Reserve Bank has
its own board of directors and its own stock-
holders, who are the member banks. After cover-
ing expenses and a statutory 6 percent dividend
paid to the member banks on the capital they
provide, the Federal Reserve Banks return their
profits to the U.S. government.
Reserve Bank directors are leading citizens
active in the Bank’s Federal Reserve district.
Each board has nine members, six elected by the
member banks in the district and three appointed
by the Board of Governors. Reserve Bank presi-
dents are appointed by the boards of directors
with the approval of the Board of Governors. All
directors and officers are explicitly nonpolitical—
they cannot hold elective office or participate
actively in partisan political campaigns as, for
example, campaign managers or fundraisers for
candidates. Thus, the top leadership of the
Reserve Banks is removed from politics, further
contributing to the Fed’s independence.
The Federal Reserve Banks, then, are the
quasi-private part of the Federal Reserve System.
The Banks draw on private sector knowledge
and expertise in pursuing the Fed’s mission. The
structure of the boards and oversight from the
Board of Governors ensure that private sector
representation will serve public purposes. The
System is politically accountable but separated
from day-to-day political pressures. This struc-
ture serves public purposes more efficiently and
effectively than would a purely federal agency.
That private-sector influence is also important
in the Fed’s analysis of the economy and mone-
tary policymaking. Each Federal Reserve District
not only serves the people within its geographi-
cal borders but also brings regional perspectives
and information to bear on national issues. It is
important to distinguish regional perspectives
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structure does not serve regional interests per se
but instead brings information and regional per-
spectives to bear on national responsibilities.
Because the United States is a fully integrated
national economy, monetary policy decisions
affect the entire country and there is no possibility
of conducting separate regional monetary policies.
I believe that it is critical to the Fed’s success
that monetary policy decisions are a consensus
outcome reflecting views from Washington—the
Governors—and from around the country—the
Reserve Bank presidents.
The Fed System opened its doors in 1914, or
125 years after the U.S. Constitution became the
law of the land. You might think that every coun-
try would have a central bank from day one, and
Congress did charter the First Bank of the United
States in 1791. But banking was a controversial
subject in the early days; Thomas Jefferson, for
example, argued against chartering the bank, say-
ing the Constitution did not empower Congress
to create a central bank.
Congress refused to renew The First Bank’s
charter after 20 years because of the public outcry
over its concentration of money and power. But
the need for a central bank did not disappear,
and a few years later Congress chartered the
Second Bank of the United States. It was even
larger than the first and, hence, more powerful.
Again, there was opposition from some well-
known leaders, including President Andrew
Jackson. His attacks on the Bank’s power struck
a popular chord with farmers, small businesses,
small banks and many politicians; all of them
perceived the Bank to be a giant obstacle in their
path to success. The Bank was shut down when
its charter expired in 1836. Between 1836 and
1914, when the Federal Reserve began its opera-
tions, the United States struggled with an unsat-
isfactory banking system lacking in central
authority and direction.
An important difference between the Federal
Reserve today and the First and Second Banks
was the perceived political links of the earlier
Banks. In the minds of many, the early Banks
were seen as a political arm of the powerful peo-
ple in the federal government. You don’t often
hear such comments today, and with good reason.
As I’ve emphasized, the Federal Reserve System
was set up to be independent of day-to-day pres-
sures from the federal government, but to be
clearly accountable to Congress. The governance
structure of the Federal Reserve, designed to keep
the Fed out of politics, has been successful in
doing so and has contributed importantly to
sound monetary policy.
FINANCIAL EVOLUTION
With rapid change in the nation’s and world’s
financial system, the Federal Reserve has had to
change, too. The Fed’s public-private structure
has helped the institution to adapt and change
successfully.
Here are just three among many changes in
the Federal Reserve System that you might not
be aware of:
• The Reserve Banks are becoming a network
of specialists, just as many others in cor-
porate America are doing. In the days before
computers and interstate banking, each of
the 12 Federal Reserve Banks around the
country provided almost all services and
products to the commercial banks in its
district. While some products were similar,
many services and their prices varied by
district. With today’s nationwide and large
regional banks, differences in Fed services
and procedures cause problems for the
many commercial banks that operate across
Federal Reserve District boundaries. Thus,
Reserve Banks have largely standardized
their offerings. At the same time, Reserve
Banks are carving out specialties so that,
together, they can gain efficiencies. Certain
Reserve Banks are responsible for develop-
ing and delivering particular products and
services. Others are marketing them. One of
the St. Louis Fed’s specialties, for example,
is to develop new software applications
for the U.S. Treasury, which is increasing
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to reduce costs and improve services.
• The Fed is cutting by more than half the
number of Reserve Bank sites around the
country that process checks. The Fed is
contracting its paper-processing facilities
because people are writing fewer checks
in favor of using credit cards, debit cards
and other forms of electronic payment.
Check-processing has been a huge busi-
ness for the Fed, which has traditionally
processed about one-third of all checks
written in this country. The Fed has been
encouraging this transition because an
electronic payments system is cheaper,
more reliable and more secure than a paper-
based one. All of these benefits are impor-
tant to the Fed because a safe and efficient
payments system is one of the Fed’s key
responsibilities.
• A third major change involves the increas-
ingly open and public way the Fed con-
ducts monetary policy. The FOMC is not
the secretive group it once was. Not until
1994 did the FOMC release a press state-
ment following a policy action. The markets
employed a small army of Fed watchers to
determine whether the Fed’s open market
operations indicated a change in the com-
mittee’s policy stance. Today, the FOMC is
quite open with its actions. Policy deci-
sions are announced shortly after they are
made, at a standard 2:15 p.m. Eastern time
after the FOMC meeting concludes. At that
time, the committee also issues a policy
statement that outlines the rationale for the
policy decision. Fed officials speak to the
general public and testify before Congress
often about the reasons for policy decisions
in an effort to help people understand the
role of the Fed and why it does what it does.
As a result of this transparency, the markets
are more in synch with FOMC decisions;
the best evidence of this fact is the enor-
mous decline in market volatility when
FOMC policy decisions become known
compared to the earlier era.
Now, let’s move on to some of the more spe-
cific changes that are occurring in the Fed’s three
main areas of work.
In supervision and regulation, technology is
changing the practice of bank examination. The
Fed used to rely on examiner on-site visits to
banks to make sure that loans were properly
documented, that banks had lined up enough
sound collateral before issuing loans, that there
was no red-lining going on, and so forth. Today,
examiners still make those visits, but much of
the monitoring of the books is handled off-site,
thanks to computerized information systems. And
the examiners are much more forward-looking.
They go beyond the record-keeping of current
and past performance to look for problems that
might be on the horizon so that they can be headed
off. Examiners are looking ahead by focusing on
risk management—such things as internal risk
controls and portfolio concentrations.
Adding to the challenge is the ever-increasing
size and sophistication of major banks today.
The largest banks now have revenue that dwarfs
the GDP of some countries.
Obviously, being a bank examiner is more
challenging today than it was even 10 or 20 years
ago. As banking becomes increasingly compli-
cated, bank examiners must keep up through
extensive training and specialization. Already,
Fed examiners increasingly specialize in partic-
ular aspects of overseeing large, complex banking
organizations.
Moreover, because there are three primary
federal banking regulators—besides the Fed, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—the
Fed needs to work cooperatively with other agen-
cies. Some regulatory issues also involve the
Office of Thrift Supervision, the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission. The Fed also coor-
dinates its bank examinations with state banking
commissions. Clearly, the task of banking super-
vision and regulation involves multiple levels of
complexity. The Reserve Banks’ regional presence
and extensive contacts with state regulators and
the private sector, including the banking industry,
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nication that might not otherwise exist.
Similarly, dramatic changes are taking place
in another area of Fed responsibility—financial
services to banks. The Fed does still fly and truck
boxes of checks all over the country to settle
accounts. But the Fed is also encouraging banks
to transport digital images of checks along fiber
optic networks. This innovation was made pos-
sible by the Check Clearing for the 21st Century
Act, better known as Check 21. Congress enacted
this legislation in 2003 with the support of the
Fed. The new technology permitted by Check 21
speeds up funds settlements while reducing pro-
cessing costs and boosting security.
The Fed is also keeping tabs on other devel-
opments in electronic forms of payment, such as
smart cards and debit cards. The Fed has helped
pioneer some electronic payments systems itself,
such as the automated clearing house. But the
Fed’s main role in this regard should be oversee-
ing standards for these new products to ensure
that the payments system is reliable and accessi-
ble to all.
Another change in financial services involves
using subcontractors in the handling of currency.
When the St. Louis Fed shut down its check-
processing operations in Little Rock and
Louisville, the Bank decided that it no longer
made sense to provide currency services the old
way. It wasn’t economical to maintain large build-
ings and staff primarily for storing and circulating
currency for local commercial banks. The solu-
tion was to outsource this service through cash
depots set up by armored carriers. This arrange-
ment, though painful for our employees who have
lost their jobs, has served our customers well
and is creating substantial savings for taxpayers.
And, I’m proud to say, other Reserve Banks are
following the St. Louis Fed model in establishing
cash depots.
Monetary policy is another area of innova-
tion. Almost all press coverage of monetary policy
focuses on the most recent policy decision and
speculation about future policy decisions. Such
discussion has been a staple of press coverage
for decades.
Fed innovation has strengthened monetary
policy decisionmaking. The Fed’s large staff of
professional economists at the Board of Governors
and the Reserve Banks has made important strides
in economic modeling and policy analysis.
Another aspect of policy practice today is that
the Fed gathers much information beyond the
standard statistical releases, which report such
important data as monthly employment and
unemployment. One part of this process is quite
formal, and it yields the Beige Book, published
shortly before every FOMC meeting. The Beige
Book is a collection of anecdotal information
gathered by Fed economists in each district over
the weeks prior to an FOMC meeting. Economists
call a long list of companies to ask about what is
happening in their markets and how their markets
might change in the near future. These nuggets
of information are summarized and made avail-
able to both FOMC members and the general
public. Confidential information from individual
firms is not disclosed; this practice assures Beige
Book contacts that they can speak candidly.
I, along with other Reserve Bank presidents,
also make calls to business leaders shortly before
every FOMC meeting. The St. Louis Fed and
other Fed Banks have meetings with diverse
groups throughout the year to add to the store of
insights.
Because anecdotal information can be so
helpful, the Fed is putting more effort into gath-
ering it. At the St. Louis Fed, we’ve created what
we call our Branching Out initiative. We have
transformed our Branches from purely operating
units to the much broader role of providing a
more visible intellectual presence in our branch
cities. We added community affairs staff and
economic education staff to each Branch to boost
public understanding of monetary policy and of
the economy in general. We work with high
schools on economic education and many groups
in our communities on financial literacy so that
people will be better able to handle their financial
affairs without, for example, falling prey to preda-
tory lenders. We send our economists around the
Eighth District to make public presentations, and
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more people than ever before.
Our effort stems from our recognition that
we need a strong base of local information and
local understanding of the economy. We need
local insight into who’s hiring, who’s firing, who’s
investing in new equipment and buildings,
whether home sales are going up or down,
whether local businesses are expanding and
much more. I use this information in thinking
about my role as a member of the FOMC.
As for the FOMC meetings themselves, the
mystique created by the media is a tad overblown.
The responsibility is great, the surroundings are
intimidating—we meet in a 56-foot-long board-
room with a half-ton chandelier hanging over
our heads. The brainpower assembled in the
room is impressive. But, other than the real-time
anecdotal information we’ve collected, we have
very little information that anyone else couldn’t
gather. If you read the minutes of the meetings,
and especially if you read the verbatim meeting
transcript that is released with a five-year lag, you
will see we aren’t all on the same page all the
time. We debate. We discuss the data. We listen
to one another’s anecdotes about how the econ-
omy is doing. We even chuckle over amusing
quips. Then, after reviewing expert staff analysis
and all the information and wisdom we can
muster, we reach a consensus monetary policy
decision. The Fed chairman, of course, leads the
discussion and defines the consensus, but when
any of us believes sufficiently strongly that
another policy course would be better, we enter
a dissent. And when the FOMC meeting is over,
we adjourn and have a lunch of soup, cold cuts
and salads, just as we are about to do today.
But, before we eat, I’d be delighted to take a
few questions. I will ask you, however, to con-
fine your questions to the subject matter of the
speech. The FOMC has a long-standing practice
of not discussing monetary policy and related
issues the week before and the week of an FOMC
meeting. So, while after a speech I ordinarily
take questions on any and all subjects, today is
different because we had an FOMC meeting only
two days ago.
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